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Abstract 
Existent literature is by no means conclusive on the effects of trade finance on trade and the economy. We propose a suitable 
framework to explore the linkages between international trade and finance based on an international real business cycle model 
where firms require external finance to import and can be financially constrained. We find that credit shocks do affect the dynamic 
properties of the economy and they have the potential to cause significant deviations in trade and economic performance. The 
trade-to-GDP ratio falls following a negative credit shock, as the shock reduces the capability of firms to purchase foreign 
intermediate goods, thereby reducing efficiency and production. However, it forces a demand substitution towards domestic 
intermediate goods that limits GDP deterioration. We also find that financially developed countries trade more, are richer and more 
stable in terms of GDP and consumption, consistence with the empirical evidence. Finally, the model sheds light on persistent 
contradictions between theoretical business-cycle and their empirical counterparts, namely, the consumption/output anomaly and 
the volatility of consumption, imports and terms of trade relative to GDP. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences. 
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1. Introduction 
We refer to trade finance as either a) one of the mechanisms provided by financial institutions and governments to 
facilitate international trade activities, or b) an agreement whereby a customer can purchase goods on account, paying 
the supplier at a later date. When trade occurs across borders, sellers require either cash-in-advance payments or 
formal guarantees to cover themselves from the possibility of insolvency of their buyers. Importers are usually forced 
to turn to loans or letters of credit to satisfy exporter requirements before having their orders shipped. Most of these 
contracts are provided by financial institutions and require some form of collateral. 
© 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open acc ss article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of IISES-International Institute for Social and Economics Sciences.
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Trade finance is an extremely important piece of the international trade mechanism; estimates find that around 90% 
of international trade relies on some form of credit (Auboin, 2009). Since the "great trade collapse”, a large number 
of studies has been devoted to clarifying the reasons why this episode occurred. In spite of these efforts, there is still 
little consensus on the effects of trade finance on macroeconomic variables and, specifically, on international trade 
performance.  
We make a theoretical contribution to this debate within the framework of an International Real Business Cycle 
(IRBC) model. We propose a dynamic, quantitative, micro-founded macroeconomic model that builds on the standard 
model of IRBC proposed by (Backus, et al., 1992) (BKK). We introduce an additional requirement for importers, who 
must borrow proportionally to the value of the goods they wish to import. This feature enables us to shed some light 
on the role of credit in international trade performance.  
Our model provides some relevant improvements over standard IRBC models. Indeed, imports are more volatile 
than GDP, our quantitative analysis does not suffer from the consumption/output anomaly (i.e., GDP cross-country 
correlation is larger than consumption cross-country correlation, as in the data), and the volatilities of consumption, 
imports, and terms of trade relative to GDP are close to those in recent US data. The latter is a property that, as far as 
we know, required the introduction of non-standard preferences into the model of IRBCs (Raffo, 2008). The financially 
constrained economy produces negative correlations for net exports and terms of trade with national output. These 
correlations are found to be positive in standard IRBC models (and in our non-constrained economy), opposite to data. 
Using a counterfactual analysis we test the macroeconomic effects of alterations in the availability of finance to 
importers. Compared to a productivity shock of the same size, we find that trade finance does not appear to have a 
large effect on the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates over the business cycle. However, recent empirical literature 
show that, indeed, credit shocks account for a large share of the fluctuations of macro-magnitudes, as large as 
productivity shocks, suggesting that volatility is, indeed, much larger (See, for instance, (Helbling, et al., 2011) and 
(Hristov, et al., 2012)). A negative credit shock reduces the ability of a producer to use foreign inputs, thereby reducing 
efficiency, which negatively affects aggregate production. However it also stimulates demand for domestic goods, 
making them more expensive and harder to come by in foreign markets and reducing exports as well. The net effect 
on the trade balance is positive, which together with higher demand for domestic goods from constrained importers 
alleviates the fall in GDP. Hence trade falls faster than GDP in our model following a credit shock. However, unless 
the variance of credit shocks is much larger than that of productivity shocks, these effects appear to be small in 
comparison to the effects of productivity shocks, which remain the main drivers of business cycles in our model. 
Section 2 presents the model setup and defines the equilibrium of the theoretical economy. Section 3 presents a 
number of international real-business cycle statistics. We use these numbers to calibrate the model and test its 
numerical properties. Section 4 contains our main results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model economy 
There are two countries. We denote foreign country variables by an asterisk. Countries are identical except for the 
stream of productivity shocks they receive. A country consists of four types of agents: Infinitely lived households, the 
ultimate holders of savings and debt in the model. Final-good firms put together a basket of domestically produced 
intermediate goods; their output is a final good that can be used for consumption or the accumulation of capital by 
households. Final goods are sold domestically in perfectly competitive markets. Intermediate good firms operate in 
a monopolistically competitive setting. They use a fixed amount of labor each period to combine domestic and foreign 
inputs and manufacture their goods. The amount of foreign inputs they use in production is limited by how much they 
can borrow to finance their imports. How much they produce depends also on their productivity level, which is affected 
by a random productivity shock. Production inputs are bought from domestic and foreign input producers, who 
combine capital and labor in their production process. They can sell their products in domestic markets or export to 
foreign intermediate good producers.  
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Financial intermediaries are not explicitly modeled in this paper.* We assume competitive financial intermediaries 
channel household savings to intermediate good producers, who require financial support to access to imported input 
goods. Default is never an optimal choice for borrowers. Household savings are pooled across countries. This allows 
for unbalanced trade in the model. 
2.1. Households 
Each country has a mass 1 of identical households. Their utility at each period is given by a strictly concave function  
u(ct,1-nt), where ct is consumption and nt the fraction of the time household members spend at work. Furthermore, 
they choose how much they invest in new capital ( it ) and how much they lend to importers ( st ). There is a small cost 
of holding savings in the form of credit to importers equal to  థଶ ݏ௧ିଵଶ .† 
Household earnings come from the salaries they perceive for the amount of time they spend at work ( wt ), from the 
share of profits they receive from intermediate good firms ( πt ), the interest they are paid on their savings ( rt ), and 
the rents that accrue to them from input producers who rent the capital they own ( Rt ). Hence, the budget constraint 
for each period is  
ܿ௧ ൅ ݅௧ ൅ ݏ௧ ൅ థଶ ݏ௧ିଵଶ ൑ ݓ௧݊௧ ൅ ߨ௧ ൅ ݏ௧ିଵሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ ൅ ܭ௧ିଵܴ௧ ǡ࿤ ݐǤ    (1) 
Physical capital is subject to depreciation at rate δ every period. Following (Backus & Crucini, 2000), physical 
capital formation is subject to adjustment costs, which are captured by a function Ψ(ڄ), which satisfies Ψ >0 , Ψ '>0 , 
and Ψ ''<0 . Capital evolves according to 
  
Kt = (1- δ) Kt-1 + Ψ (it /Kt -1) Kt-1 ,          (2) 
 
We use Ψ ( i/k )=(i/k ) ψ , ψ א ( 0,1 ) , so investment is described by the change in capital stocks as follows: it = ( 
Kt/ Kt-1 -( 1- δ ) ) 1/ψ Kt -1. If households discount utility from future periods at rate β, optimizing behavior is described 
by the following problem: 
 

൛௖೟ǡ௡೟ǡ௦೟ǡ௄೟ൟ೟సబ
ಮ σ ߚ௧ݑሺܿ௧ǡ ͳ െ ݊௧ሻஶ௧ୀ଴         (3) 
 
s.t. (1) and (2)      
 
Letting u(c,1-n) = [cμ. (1-n )1- μ]θ /θ , the marginal utilities of consumption and labor are given by ݑ௖ǡ௧ ൌ
ߤܿ௧ఏఓିଵሺͳ െ ݊௧ሻఏሺଵିఓሻǡ ݑ௡ǡ௧ ൌ െሺͳ െ ߤሻܿ௧ఏఓሺͳ െ ݊௧ሻఏሺଵିఓሻିଵ. 
2.2. Final-good firms 
Final good firms are homogeneous, act as price takers and make zero profit. Their production function is ௧ܻ ൌ
ቀ׬ ௝݀ǡ௧ఙ ݆݀ଵ଴ ቁ
ଵ ఙൗ
, where dj,t denotes their demand of intermediate good j. Profits are given by ς ൌ ௧ܻ௧ െ ׬ ௝݀ǡ௧݌௝ǡ௧݆݀ଵ଴  . 
Maximizing profits gives their optimal demand of each variety of intermediate goods: 
௝݀ǡ௧ ൌ ௧ܻ݌௝ǡ௧
భ
഑షభ           (4) 
 
 
 
* For a model that explicitly models trade finance see (Ahn, 2011) 
†† This cost serves for the purpose of determining the steady-state value of the asset position in a zero-order approximation without the need of 
taking second-order approximations and ensuring stationarity. See (Benigno, 2009) and (Heathcote & Perri, 2002) for detailed discussions. It does 
not have any other implication for our results. 
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2.3. Intermediate-good firms (importers) 
Each country has a mass 1 of firms producing differentiated, non-tradable goods. These firms operate in a 
monopolistic competition setting. Productivity is given by a random shock z t common to all firms. Production takes 
place according to the function ܨ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ݖ௧ ௝݄ǡ௧ఈ ݔ௝ǡ௧ଵିఈǡ ߙ א ሺͲǡͳሻ, where hj,t represents the demand of domestic inputs and 
xj,t the demand of imported inputs of firm j . Firms pay a fixed cost (Q units) of labor to operate every period. Profits 
for the intermediate good producer are given by 
ߨ௝ǡ௧ ൌ ݌௝ǡ௧ ௝݀ǡ௧ െ ௧ܲ ௝݄Ǥ௧ െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ ௧ܲכݔ௝ǡ௧ െ ܳݓ௧        (5) 
where input prices are denoted by Pt and Pt *, while the intermediate good's market price is pj,t. The firm must 
borrow in order to buy imported inputs and therefore pays an interest rt over their total cost. Since imports are bought 
on credit they are subject to a trade credit constraint. We think of the degree ߟ෤ to which contracts can be enforced as 
summarizing the average quality of enforcement in a given economy. The financial intermediary behaves 
competitively. A credit constraint states that it must be individually rational for the managers to repay their loan. When 
they abide by the contract, managers receive their net income. When they default, they economize on the payment 
they owe the intermediary but lose fraction ߟ෤ of the resulting resources. i.e. ߨ௝ǡ௧ ൒ ሺͳ െ ߟ෤ሻൣߨ௝ǡ௧ ൅ ሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ ௧ܲכݔ௝ǡ௧൧, 
which implies 
 
ߟሺ݌௝ǡ௧ ௝݀ǡ௧ െ ௧ܲ ௝݄ǡ௧ െ ܳݓ௧ሻ ൒ ሺͳ ൅ ߟሻሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ ௧ܲכݔ௝ǡ௧ǡ      (6) 
 
where ߟ ൌ ఎ෥ଵିఎ෥. Suppose the firm has already chosen a price pj,t inducing demand dj,t. Taking them as given, the 
combination of domestic and foreign inputs that minimize the cost of satisfying this demand is given by 
 
௛ೕǡ೟ǡ௫ೕǡ೟ ௧ܲ ௝݄ǡ௧ ൅ ሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ ௧ܲ
כݔ௝ǡ௧         (7) 
 
s.t. 
ݖ௧ ௝݄ǡ௧ఈ ݔ௝ǡ௧ଵିఈ ൌ ௝݀ǡ௧ǡ ܽ݊݀ߟ൫݌௝ǡ௧ ௝݀ǡ௧ െ ௧ܲ ௝݄ǡ௧ െ ܳݓ௧൯ ൒ ሺͳ ൅ ߟሻሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ ௧ܲכݔ௝ǡ௧Ǥ   
 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KTCs) hj,t = λj,txj,t, where ߣ௝ǡ௧ ؠ ఈଵିఈ ൬
ଵିకೕǡ೟ఎିకೕǡ೟
ଵିకೕǡ೟ఎ
൰ ሺଵା௥೟ሻ௉೟כ௉೟  And ߞ௧  and ߦ௧  are the 
Lagrangian multipliers of the KTCs. By the first constraint then: 
 
ݔ௝ǡ௧ ൌ  ௗೕǡ೟௭೟ఒೕǡ೟ഀ            (8) 
 
We assume intermediate good firms know demand functions (4) and (8) and set their prices accordingly by solving 
the following profit maximization problem: 
 
௣ೕǡ೟ ൬݌௝ǡ௧ െ
௉೟
௭೟ఒೕǡ೟ഀషభ
െ ሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ ௉೟
כ
௭೟ఒೕǡ೟ഀ
൰ ௧ܻ݌௝ǡ௧
భ
഑షభ െ ܳݓ௧Ǥ       (9) 
 
The solution to this problem is given by 
 
݌௝ǡ௧ ൌ ଵఙ௭೟ఒೕǡ೟ഀ ൫ߣ௝ǡ௧ ௧ܲ ൅ ሺͳ ൅ ݎ௧ሻ ௧ܲ
כ൯Ǥ        (10) 
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2.4. Input producers (exporters) 
Each country has a mass 1 of identical input good firms with technologies operating in a perfectly competitive 
environment. Their technology uses capital (kt) and labor (lt) to generate output ft:  ௧݂ ൌ ݇௧ఊ݈௧ଵିఊǡ ߛ א ሺͲǡͳሻǡ an input 
producer seeks to solve the following optimization problem: 
 
௞ǡ௟ ௧ܲ ௧݂ െݓ௧݈௧ െ ܴ௧݇௧         (11) 
The usual FOCs are  ௧ܲ ௞݂ǡ௧ ൌ ߛ ௧ܲሺ௞೟௟೟ ሻ
ఊିଵ ൌ ܴ௧ǡ ܽ݊݀ ௧ܲ ௟݂ǡ௧ ൌ ሺͳ െ ߛሻ ௧ܲ ቀ௞೟௟೟ ቁ
ఊ ൌ ݓ௧ , which together imply an 
optimal capital-labor ratio equal to ௞೟௟೟ ൌ
ఊ
ଵିఊ Ǥ
௪೟
ோ೟ . 
2.5. Equilibrium 
This economy is said to be in equilibrium if every period, given a state of the economy (z, z*) and prices P , R , r , 
and w. Functions c(ڄ) , i(ڄ) , and s(ڄ) solve the household’s problem (3), given prices pj, demand functions dj solve final 
good firm problem (5) and their profits are equal to zero. hj, xj and pj are the same for all j and they solve the 
intermediate good firm problem (6) and (9). Demands of labor and capital l and k solve the maximization problem of 
input producers (11) and they have zero profits. Good markets clear: c+i=Y , dj =Fj, and f=h+x*; labor markets clear: 
l+Q=n; capital markets clear: k=K; financial markets clear: s+ s*= P*x+Px*; and no-Ponzi-scheme conditions hold. 
This model has no analytical solution. 
3. Quantitative exercise 
3.1. Calibration 
We shall understand real GDP as the sum of private consumption, investment and exports minus imports: 
GDPt=ct+it+Pxt*-P*xt , and we refer to net exports as the result of the trade balance divided by GDP, i.e., nxt=(Pxt*-
P*xt)/GDPt , where P and P * are steady state values or constant prices for the model and the data respectively. Terms 
of trade refer to the ratio of import and export prices, tott=Pt*/Pt, while the real exchange rate refers to the ratio in the 
price level of intermediate goods, rert=pt*/pt. The model is calibrated to match features of the US economy over the 
1973-2010 period. We set η=0.57, which is the baseline value used by [ (Amaral & Quintin, 2010)] to match the ratio 
of financial intermediation to GDP in US. ‡§The shock process has the usual form, ݈݋݃ ቂݖ௧ݖ௧כቃ ൌ ܣ݈݋݃ ቂ
ݖ௧ିଵ
ݖ௧ିଵכ ቃ ൅ ቂ
߳௧
߳௧כቃ 
where ሺ߳௧ǡ ߳௧כሻ is a vector of i.i.d. shocks. The covariance matrix of these shocks as well as the parameters in the 
transition matrix A are set after the values estimated by (Heathcote & Perri, 2002). The complete parametrization of 
the model is given in Table 1. 
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values. 
Parameter   Value Sourse or Target 
Risk aversion θ -1 Backus et al. (1994)  
Discount rate β 0.99 4% annualized interest rate 
Leisure share μ 0.46 Hours worked =0.34 
Depreciation rate δ 0.025 10% annualized depreciation 
Adjustment cost ψ 0.88 Volatility of investment ≈3 
Trade elasticity σ 0.77 Elasticity of substitution=4.5 
Fixed cost Q 0.01 15% import share of GDP 
 
 
‡ Simulation results do not change significantly for different values of φ and Q, even if they are set to 0. 
§ We performed a robustness test for the results in Table 2 and in the figures using different η . All the qualitative results are robust for a wide 
range of values. The most relevant changes are in the steady state and we report and analyse them at the end of this section. 
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Capital share ϒ 0.41 22% investment share of GDP 
Home bias α 0.75 Volatility of imports ε(2,3) 
Cost of saving φ 0.01 Mandelman et al. (2011) 
Shock process 
  
 
Heathcote and Perri (2002) 
Transition matrix   Heathcote and Perri (2002) 
3.2. Simulation  
The baseline model does a good job at explaining some of the discrepancies between standard international real 
business cycle models and the data.** 
Excessive consumption smoothness is one such common problem that goes away. (Raffo, 2008), (Raffo, 2010) 
suggests introducing an alternative specification of household preferences to increase consumption volatility.†† Our 
model, however, is capable of generating consumption that is as volatile as in the data with standard preferences.  
The volatility of imports is about two and a half times as large as the volatility of output, an improvement over 
standard models, which typically imply lower import volatility than output volatility. The volatility of terms of trade 
is larger than that of output and quite close in magnitude to what we observe in the data. Auto-correlations of the series 
in the model are very similar to those in the data as are domestic correlations. 
Our mechanism works as follows: when a positive productivity shock hits the economy, households have more 
income left after consumption. They decide to allocate these savings between importers that need to finance 
international purchases and input producers (serving both domestic and foreign markets) that need to finance capital. 
In any case, the extra resources make international trade cheaper: savings devoted to finance imports reduce the total 
cost of imported goods and savings used to finance exporters capital allow them to produce inputs at a lower cost, 
becoming more attractive to foreign customers. 
The correlation between output and the terms of trade is another common puzzle of international RBC models. 
Looking at long time series this correlation is typically negative  
 ( (Mendoza, 1995),  (Kehoe & Ruhl, 2008)),‡‡while the standard models predict a positive correlation. Our model 
predicts a strong negative correlation, a sign consistent with data. The same occurs with the correlation between net 
exports and domestic output, which is negative in the data and in our simulations but positive in standard RBC models. 
The latter three features of our results are specific of the financially constrained economy. They are not supported by 
the unconstrained version showed in Column “No constraint”. 
Another interesting result is that the cross-country correlation of output is stronger than that of consumption, as in 
the data. This is typically not the case in the literature: (Backus, et al., 1994) dub this the “consumption/output 
anomaly”. Recall that only national households can invest in national capital. This capital restriction prevents agents 
from sharing domestic risk further and explains the low cross-country correlation of consumption. §§  The non-
constrained economy shows larger international correlations both for consumption and output. This occurs thank to 
the existence of firms all over the world that exert a larger demand-pull effect via unconstrained imports, which 
enhance the transmission of shocks. 
 
 
 
** We ran fifty 300-period simulations of this economy, subjected to productivity shocks, and took the log of each series (except for net exports, 
which may be negative) and used a Hodrick-Prescott filter for quarterly data to remove their trends. We then averaged results from all fifty 
simulations. Table 2 presents these averages compared to their data counterparts, which have also been logged and HP-filtered as needed for 
comparison and with results in (Heathcote & Perri, 2002). 
†† GHH preferences, as introduced by [ (Greenwood, et al., 1988)], have the property that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption 
and leisure is independent of the consumption level within the period, which implies that there is no income effect on labor supply and hours worked 
respond more strongly to changes in productivity. Although this generates volatility of consumption more in line with the data, the unresponsiveness 
of labor supply to changes in consumption levels appears to be empirically troublesome. 
‡‡ (Mendoza, 1995) 
§§ See (Olivero, 2010) 
ܣ ൌ ቂ ͲǤͻ͹ ͲǤͲʹͷͲǤͲʹͷ ͲǤͻ͹ ቃ 
ఢܸ ൌ ͳͲି଺ ቂͷ͵ ͳͷͳͷ ͷ͵ቃ 
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Table 2. Simulation results 
 
To what extent do these changes depend on the presence of a credit constraint? We run a modified version of the 
model that removes condition (6). Importers can buy from foreign firms as much as they can afford and households 
trade one period non-contingent assets that allow for unbalanced trade, so that s=-s*. The model uses the previous 
calibration. Results are in the column “No constraint” of Table 2. When the constraint exists and is binding, 
intermediate firms would like to use a larger share of foreign inputs. With a positive productivity shock intermediate 
firms are able to increase their imports with the resources freed by the lower cost of domestic inputs. As a consequence, 
net exports decrease with output. After the shock, both countries increase the demand for the cheaper input. Foreign 
intermediate goods firms, which were more constrained before the shock, redirect part of their demand towards the 
cheaper input. As a result, P * decreases sufficiently to see a reduction in the terms of trade, which have a 
countercyclical behavior. Which features of the model make the quantity anomaly disappear? Column “HP 2002” of 
Table 2 reports the results for the bond economy in (Heathcote & Perri, 2002). The comparison between their model 
and ours hints us the answer.*** Their model is suitable to be compared with our no-constraint economy because it 
only differs in two relevant features: they have perfect competition for intermediate good producers, which combine 
 
 
*** Be aware that for a reliable quantitative comparison with “HP 2002” we should calibrate the No-constraint version to match actual data. 
However, we prefer to keep the same calibration used in our baseline model to observe the implications of having the credit constraint or not. 
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inputs in a CES, while we have monopolistic competition and combine inputs in a Cobb-Douglas. A productivity 
shock in the Home country causes a milder response in terms of output when competition is monopolistic. This causes 
a smaller change in relative prices and keeps a larger correlation between cross-country outputs. Moreover, with Cobb-
Douglas preferences in consumption, Home and Foreign inputs are in the limit between substitutes and complements, 
while in a CES, it depends on the selected elasticity of substitution. Any change in the relative use of inputs changes 
their relative price proportionally with a Cobb-Douglas, but not with a CES.  Although some of the differences to the 
standard international RBC model stem from other characteristics of our model, having a credit constraint allows us 
to evaluate the effects of changing conditions in financial markets to both the amount as well as the dynamic properties 
of trade. This is what we do in the next section. 
4. How trade finance affects trade 
4.1. Effects of a temporary credit shock 
In our model, household savings are the crucial source of credit availability determining the volume of trade 
attainable in this economy. The level of development of the financial system in a country and the strength of its 
institutions are captured by the parameter η . However, η can also capture changes in risk positions taken by the 
financial intermediaries. Hence, a larger η may represent both a better developed financial market and a higher level 
of confidence of banks on loan-repayment possibilities. In order to evaluate the effects of temporary credit shocks we 
need to add a second source of uncertainty in our model. We shall assume that the credit tightness parameter η is now 
time dependent with mean ߟҧ ; and a random component bt so that ߟ௧ ൌ ߟҧܾ௧  the shock process is now 
݈݋݃ ൦
ݖ௧
ݖ௧כ
ܾ௧
ܾ௧כ
൪ ൌ ܣ݈݋݃ ൦
ݖ௧ିଵ
ݖ௧ିଵכ
ܾ௧ିଵ
ܾ௧ିଵכ
൪ ൅ ൦
߳௭ǡ௧
߳௭ǡ௧כ߳௕ǡ௧
߳௕ǡ௧כ
൪ There are no reliable time-series on trade finance from which to estimate A and the 
covariance matrix of the shocks. Therefore, we consider and compare different scenarios and lay out their properties. 
As a benchmark case, we set all correlations and spillovers between financial and technology shocks to zero. 
Considering that financial shock transmission across borders has been shown to be a very relevant phenomenon among 
modern capitalist economies in recent history, we allow for a positive international correlation between trade credit 
shocks,ܿ݋ݎݎሺ߳௕ǡ ߳௕כሻ ൌ ͲǤ͹Ͳ The standard deviation for the financial shock as well as its persistence are initially set 
equal to those for the productivity shock.  
We now proceed to explore a tightening of 1% in trade credit. Continuous lines in Figure 1 show the impulse 
responses for the benchmark case. GDP initially increases and then falls below its steady state value for the rest of the 
transition. The reason is related to the change in the composition of demand by intermediate good producers. When 
the financial constraint tightens, firms must reduce their demand for imports. They substitute foreign inputs by 
relatively more expensive national products, pushing domestic production up and, hence, improving GDP. Households 
lose (at least partially) one of their saving alternatives -the finance of imports-, so they devote more resources to the 
remaining option -investment in capital-. Foreign input producers lose part of the demand and reduce prices, Pt*. 
However, Home input producers reduce their prices further. The upsurge in investment increases capital accumulation 
just after the shock. This makes it cheaper, generates a substitution from labor to capital and reduces the cost of 
production of the input and, therefore, its price. As a consequence, TOT increases (deteriorates). 
This leads to a fall in exports and, as a consequence, in national GDP. Both imports and exports over GDP are 
below the steady state during the transition. However, the negative effect of the financial tightening on imports is much 
larger than on exports, so net exports over GDP improve. The interest rate reduces also because intermediate firms 
demand less financial resources. On the other hand, the tightening in the financial constraint affects productivity: firms 
are forced to choose a less efficient mix of domestic and foreign inputs due to the restriction. The obvious consequence 
is the increase of intermediate goods prices, which damage consumption. Under the current parametrization, the 
positive effect described above dominates the negative initially. However after a few periods, investment collapse and 
the initial surge in GDP disappears. 
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Fig. 1. Change in macroeconomic aggregates following a financial shock for varying levels of financial shock persistence. 
The dashed lines in the impulse-response figures above show that the balance between positive and negative effects 
on macroeconomic aggregates crucially depends on the level of financial shock persistence. When persistence is low 
the surge in demand for domestic goods is much more short-lived, and therefore increases in investment in anticipation 
of this surge are too weak to counteract the negative effects of credit-tightening on productivity and exports. Figure 2 
illustrates what happens if international correlations drop to 0.50. This change affects the magnitude but not the shape 
of the response. In the benchmark case, since the shock is transmitted abroad more forcefully, foreign firms find it 
more difficult to finance imports and hence exports fall significantly more than in the case of milder spillovers. With 
lower transmission of financial shocks effects over GDP and other macroeconomic aggregates are much milder. We 
reach virtually the same conclusions if we compare economies with different levels of financial spillovers. 
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Fig. 2. Change in macroeconomic aggregates following a financial shock for varying levels of international correlations. 
Our results are robust to changes in the correlation between financial and technology shocks. If these are different 
from zero, only the magnitude of the shocks is affected. A positive correlation accentuates the negative effects of a 
financial shock on productivity, as there will be a loss in efficiency due to a less desirable mix of foreign and domestic 
inputs and a downgrade in the technology used to combine them. Finally, we compare credit shocks and technology 
shocks in Figure 3. Both shocks have the same variance, and except for the case of GDP and investment, both have 
effects in the same direction. The most striking difference is in the magnitude of them, as credit shock effects appear 
to be much weaker. This explains why the introduction of credit shocks appears to make little difference. However, 
evidence by (Helbling, et al., 2011) show our result does not imply they are unimportant. Their variance decomposition 
show credit shocks contribute as much to fluctuations. 
  
Fig. 3. Comparing credit and technology shocks. 
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Finally, we run a comparative statics analysis of a change in the financial situation of an economy. The qualitative 
consequences of a permanent tightening in η are the following: A more constrained financial market reduces GDP in 
the steady state. This result is supported by several papers showing a positive link between financial development and 
economic growth (See (Levine, 2005) and (Papaioannou, 2008)for a complete survey on the issue.). Imports, on the 
other hand, decline more than GDP, moving from a 12% to 8% when η changes from .57 to .37, which is approximately 
the 5% decrease experienced by US real imports over real GDP ratio from its peak to its valley in the recent crisis. 
When we isolate the financial channel by worsening importers access to financial resources, independently of any 
other shocks, imports are much more damaged than GDP. This may be the case because imports are restricted and 
firms need to turn to national production, partially offsetting the downturn in GDP. The economy is less open in trade 
to foreign markets, cross-border spillovers are milder, making all real variables more correlated with national GDP. 
Net exports react considerably and become much more negatively correlated with GDP. The lower interrelation causes 
cross-country correlations to decrease. Although savings are still pooled across borders, one of the international 
transmission mechanisms, trade, has been partially blocked. 
5. Conclusions 
This model provides theoretical support for the role of the financial channel in explaining part of the large decline 
in the trade levels for many countries following episodes of financial distress. Firms are bound by a financial constraint 
when they want to import. However, regardless of the explicit financial constraint, which affects importers, all firms 
in need for external finance rely on households’ capability for saving. This capability is larger and, hence, the constraint 
is looser during economic expansions because households are able to save more. Indeed, when savings increase, 
households allocate them between credit to importers and savings in the form of capital which is rented to exporters. 
Whatever the decision they take, they make international trade finance cheaper. A credit tightening episode worsens 
the capability of importers to get access to foreign suppliers, who require guarantees to ship their products. This 
reduces imports dramatically and, although output is also damaged, some demand is reallocated to domestic goods, 
cushioning part of the decline in GDP. Therefore, while output, consumption and investment decline at the same 
proportion after a credit tightening, imports are hit much harder.  
Despite the importance of credit shocks to individual importers, their large-scale impact on the economy appears 
to be limited at business cycle frequencies, unless trade finance is much more volatile than productivity. But, this 
larger volatility that makes the effects of credit shocks sizable is, indeed, what evidence highlights.  
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first in the international real-business-cycle literature to consider the 
role of trade finance. Our model is able to shed light on many persistent contradictions between theoretical business-
cycle volatilities and their empirical counterparts. 
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